

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 BONN 07386 01 OF 05 282139Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----282159Z 035844 /45

O R 282129Z APR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7804  
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 07386

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR PGOV WB GW US UK FR  
SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL: QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS ON  
BERLIN AND GERMANY (ASSESSMENT)

REF: BONN 6593

BEGIN SUMMARY. THE BONN GROUP ON APRIL 28 REACHED AD  
REF AGREEMENT ON THE SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT ASSESSMENT  
FOR THE MAY QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS DEALING WITH THE  
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF EVENTS IN BERLIN SINCE THE  
DECEMBER MEETING. THE DRAFT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION WHEN  
THE BONN GROUP GOES OVER A CLEAN COPY OF THE DRAFT  
ON APRIL 29, BUT WE ARE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT AS IT  
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PAGE 02 BONN 07386 01 OF 05 282139Z

NOW STANDS FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S ADVANCE INFORMATION.  
DRAFTING ON THE FIRST SECTION (ECONOMIC AND  
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS) WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ON APRIL 29.  
AS REPORTED IN REFTEL, THAT SECTION WILL BE RELATIVELY  
BRIEF BECAUSE THE VIABILITY STUDY HAS NOT YET BEEN  
COMPLETED. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT

BONN GROUP ASSESSMENT

I. THE INTERNAL SITUATION

(TEXT TO BE SUPPLIED LATER.)

II. POLITICAL PROBLEMS

A. WHAT THE QA MEANT

THE 1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS BOTH A PRODUCT OF AND A CATALYST TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. IT MARKED A SUSPENSION -- FOR SO LONG AS DETENTE LASTS -- OF THE CRISIS-RIDDEN ASPECTS OF THE "BERLIN PROBLEM," BUT IT DID NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

FOR THE WESTERN SIDE, THE IMPROVEMENTS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE QA WERE SIGNIFICANT. THEY INCLUDE THE GUARANTEES OF UNIMPEDED CIVILIAN ACCESS THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN, THE OPENING-UP OF POSSIBILITIES FOR VISITS TO THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN AND THE GDR, AND, MOST NOTABLY, THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH BERLIN.

THE QA WAS VALUABLE FOR THE EASTERN SIDE AS WELL. IT SET IN TRAIN A PROCESS BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION OBTAINED SOME OF ITS LONG-SOUGHT OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING  
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PAGE 03 BONN 07386 01 OF 05 282139Z

WESTERN AGREEMENT ON CSCE, RATIFICATION BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF ITS BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE USSR AND POLAND, AND A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE GDR GAINED INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THE BETTER CLIMATE OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS HAS BROUGHT PRACTICAL BENEFITS FOR THE GDR. BUT THESE ALSO BROUGHT SOME SERIOUS PROBLEMS AS WELL, AND AS FOR BERLIN ITSELF, NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR, ESPECIALLY, THE GDR OBTAINED FROM THE QA ALL THAT THEY DESIRED.

THE SOVIET HOPE OF CONVERTING THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN INTO AN "INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY" WAS NO CLOSER TO REALIZATION AFTER THE QA THAN BEFORE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MORE DEMONSTRATIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN AND THE FRG, SUCH AS MEETINGS OF THE FULL BUNDESTAG IN BERLIN, WERE

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PAGE 01 BONN 07386 02 OF 05 282142Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 07386

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ELIMINATED, THE QA LEFT BASICALLY UNTOUCHED THE CLOSE  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN AND  
THE FRG -- A RELATIONSHIP ESSENTIAL TO THE VIABILITY OF  
THE CITY.

FURTHERMORE, THE QA LEFT THE GDR STILL SHORT OF  
ITS GOAL OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY. THE QA DID NOT TOUCH UPON  
THE ALLIED RIGHTS ON THE ACCESS ROUTES AND IN THE AIR  
CORRIDORS, AND THESE RIGHTS WERE IN FACT CONFIRMED IN THE  
QUADRIPARTITE DECLARATION MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE  
ENTRY OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES INTO THE UNITED NATIONS.  
IN ADDITION, BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED IN THE QA DELIBERATELY  
AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE -- "THE RELEVANT AREA" -- WHICH LEFT  
UNAFFECTED THE WESTERN LEGAL POSITION THAT QUADRIPARTITE  
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL OF  
BERLIN -- INCLUDING THE "CAPITAL OF THE GDR."

B. SOVIET AND GDR TACTICS SINCE THE QA

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PAGE 02 BONN 07386 02 OF 05 282142Z

IN THE YEARS SINCE THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR HAVE GRADUALLY INTENSIFIED THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ON THEIR POSITION. WHILE BOTH SIDES HAVE SOUGHT TO RESOLVE THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE QA IN THEIR FAVOR, THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS IN MANY INSTANCES TO HAVE GONE BEYOND THAT. IT HAS SOUGHT TO DEPRIVE THE PROVISION ON MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF THE MEANING WHICH THE WESTERN SIDE BELIEVED WAS INTENDED.

PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED SEVERAL PROBLEM AREAS CONCERNING THE TIES, IN PARTICULAR THE FEDERAL PRESENCE IN BERLIN AND THE EXERCISE BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN ABROAD. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN HAS BEEN THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY AS "ILLEGAL" THE INCLUSION OF BERLIN IN DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

WHILE CONTINUING THEIR ATTACK ON BERLIN'S TIES WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS HAVE ALSO TAKEN ACTION WHICH HAS A MORE DIRECT IMPACT ON ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

THE GDR, ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH SOVIET CONSENT AND WITH CLEAR VERBAL SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW, HAS SOUGHT TO PROVE THAT "THE RELEVANT AREA" OF THE QA DOES NOT INCLUDE THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN. ITS FORMAL STATEMENTS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT SUCH MEASURES AS THE CHANGE IN VISA PROCEDURES, THE EXTENSION OF THE GDR ROAD USE TAX TO VEHICLES ENTERING THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN, THE TERMINATION OF THE "LEGAL GAZETTE FOR GREATER BERLIN," AND THE REMOVAL OF POLICE CHECKPOINTS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN THE EASTERN SECTOR AND THE GDR

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PAGE 03 BONN 07386 02 OF 05 282142Z

WERE ALL DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN AND THE GDR.

THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR TERMINATION OF ALLIED MILITARY PATROLS IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN IS A POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS EFFORT TO SHOW THAT ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE LIMITED TO THE WESTERN SECTORS.

IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS THE CONTINUING WISH OF THE GDR TO ELIMINATE THE LAST

REMAINING FEATURES WHICH UNDERMINE ITS CLAIM THAT THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS TERRITORY. IT IS LESS CLEAR WHY THE SOVIET UNION ACQUIESCED AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME IN THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GDR IN RECENT MONTHS. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES:

-- A CONVICTION THAT THE ALLIES AND THE FRG WOULD NOT REACT, EITHER BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL MEASURES WERE MINOR ENOUGH TO ESCAPE NOTICE, OR BECAUSE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS ON THE WESTERN SIDE MAY HAVE REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD, AS ASSESSED BY MOSCOW, OF STRONG REACTIONS DURING THE PAST FALL AND WINTER.

-- INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN THE GDR. MOSCOW MAY HAVE AGREED THAT A BOOST TO GDR CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY WOULD INCREASE RESPECT FOR THE REGIME AND WOULD, LIKE FURTHER MEASURES TO DETER

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PAGE 01 BONN 07386 03 OF 05 282148Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 07386

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EMIGRATION, SERVE TO DAMPEN BUDDING INTERNAL DISSENT.

-- A NEED TO COMPENSATE THE GDR FOR MEASURES  
TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS AT EAST GERMAN

EXPENSE -- E.G., IN CEMA ECONOMIC RELATIONS OR IN  
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS MBFR.

-- A DESIRE TO REMIND THE WEST THAT BERLIN REMAINS  
VULNERABLE TO SOVIET PRESSURES -- CONCEIVABLY IN  
RETALIATION FOR WHAT THE SOVIETS REGARD AS UNACCEPT-  
ABLE FEDERAL ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN OR AS AN UNSATISFAC-  
TORY RESPONSE TO SOVIET EFFORTS (AS EMBODIED  
PARTICULARLY IN THEIR STRONG DECLARATION OF LAST

AUGUST) TO INFLUENCE ALLIED DECISIONS ON BERLIN'S  
FUTURE RELATIONSHIP TO THE EC.

-- A CONVICTION THAT THE NATURAL LIMITS TO  
EXPANSION OF THE FRUITS OF DETENTE HAVE ALREADY BEEN  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 07386 03 OF 05 282148Z

REACHED, AND THAT THERE IS THEREFORE NO REASON TO  
DELAY LONGER THE SYSTEMATIC EFFORTS TO MOVE THE BERLIN  
PROBLEM CLOSER TO SOLUTION.

#### C. IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET DEMAND THAT  
ALLIED PATROLS IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN SHOULD  
CEASE IMPLIES A CURTAILMENT OF ALLIED RIGHTS. THE  
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GDR, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE  
INDIVIDUALLY BEEN OF LIMITED IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULT  
TO CONTEST AS SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS OF QUADRIPARTITE  
AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE  
BEEN AT PAINS TO ARGUE THAT THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILI-  
OF THE THREE POWERS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. BUT THE  
SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARGUE THAT A GREATER BERLIN WITH A  
SPECIAL STATUS NO LONGER EXISTS AND THAT THE EASTERN  
SECTOR OF BERLIN IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE  
SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OF THE GDR. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE  
ABDICATED WHAT WE CONTEND ARE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN  
THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN. THEY ASSERT, MOST  
RECENTLY IN THEIR NOTE OF MARCH 10, THAT THE QA  
CONFIRMED THE POSITION WHICH THEY HAD PRESSED DURING  
THE NEGOTIATIONS: THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THAT  
AGREEMENT WAS THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN ONLY.

ONE COULD SEE THE FOLLOWING DANGERS FOR THE  
WESTERN SIDE:

-- IF THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE RIGHT TO TRANSFER  
TO THE GDR CERTAIN OF ITS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
IN BERLIN, THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT  
SIMILARLY TRANSFER TO THE GDR RIGHTS IN AREAS VITAL TO

THE ALLIED PRESENCE IN BERLIN -- E.G., THE SURFACE  
ACCESS ROUTES AND THE AIR CORRIDORS.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 07386 03 OF 05 282148Z

-- IN DEMONSTRATING THAT, BECAUSE QUADRIPARTITE  
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS CONFIRMED IN THE QA STILL  
EXIST BUT APPLY ONLY TO THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN,  
THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE ENHANCING THEIR CLAIMS THAT  
THEY MUST BE CONSULTED ON DECISIONS CONCERNING THE  
WESTERN SECTORS.

-- THE TACTICS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR  
HAVE THE EFFECT OF GRADUALLY INCREASING THE COMPETENCE  
OF THE GDR, THUS MAKING THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES  
IN AND FOR BERLIN LESS CLEAR-CUT. THIS DEVELOPMENT  
WOULD LEAD TO A REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESENT ARRANGE-  
MENTS, WHICH IMPLY AN EXCLUSIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE  
THREE ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION, BY NEW  
ARRANGEMENTS TO WHICH THE GDR WOULD BE DIRECTLY OR  
NOT A PARTY. IT WOULD IN THAT CASE BE DIFFICULT FOR  
THE THREE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT SITUATION  
BASED ON THE ORIGINAL RIGHTS OF THE FOUR POWERS; THEY  
WOULD NO DOUBT FIND THEMSELVES OBLIGED TO ACCEPT  
GRADUAL CHANGES IN THIS SITUATION WHICH COULD  
EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THEIR PRESENCE IN BERLIN BEING  
PUT IN QUESTION.

THE SOVIET UNION THUS APPEARS ONCE MORE TO  
BE QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ALLIED  
PRESENCE IN BERLIN, AN ISSUE WHICH HAD BEEN SET ASIDE

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PAGE 01 BONN 07386 04 OF 05 282149Z  
ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 07386

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BY THE QA. THE SOVIET UNION HAS LONG CONTENDED THAT  
THAT PRESENCE RESTS NOT ON ORIGINAL RIGHTS BUT ON FOUR-  
POWER AGREEMENTS. RECENT EVENTS SEEM DESIGNED TO GIVE  
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT THOSE AGREEMENTS HAVE LOST  
THEIR RELEVANCE.

D. PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE

DESPITE THE RHETORIC, THERE REMAIN CERTAIN  
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN AND  
THE GDR WHICH BELIE THE CLAIMS OF THE GDR TO FULL  
SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS "CAPITAL." THESE INCLUDE  
DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE  
STATUS OF BERLIN (E.G., VISA PROCEDURES AND MINIMUM  
CURRENCY EXCHANGE REGULATIONS), DISTINCTIONS WHICH  
DIRECTLY REFLECT THE STATUS OF BERLIN (IN PARTICULAR,  
THE INDIRECT ELECTION OF EAST BERLINERS IN THE  
VOLKSKAMMER), AND FINALLY RESTRICTIONS ON GDR SOVEREIGNTY  
WHICH ARE COROLLARIES OF QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 BONN 07386 04 OF 05 282149Z

RESPONSIBILITIES (MOST NOTABLY THE AIR REGIME IN THE  
BERLIN CONTROL ZONE AND THE RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO AND FREE  
CIRCULATION IN THE EASTERN SECTOR BY ALLIED FORCES  
PERSONNEL).

UNCERTAINTY AS TO SOVIET MOTIVES FOR PERMITTING  
THE MEASURES RECENTLY TAKEN BY THE GDR MAKES IT DIFFICULT  
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES  
INTEND TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP ALLIED FLAG PATROLS.  
BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH VISIBILITY, THE PATROLS -- EVEN  
MORE THAN THE ACCESS ROUTES AND THE AIR CORRIDORS --  
SERVE TO UNDERCUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GDR REGIME IN  
THE EYES OF THE EAST GERMAN POPULACE AND THE GROWING  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN BERLIN. MOREOVER, SOVIET  
PRESTIGE IS INVOLVED IN A DEMAND OF THIS NATURE, AND  
IT THUS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THEY INTEND TO



IMPLEMENT THEIR WORDS WITH DEEDS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE CALCULATED THAT THEIR DEMARCHES WOULD BE REJECTED AND THAT ANY FORCEFUL INTERFERENCE WITH THE PATROLS COULD LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION. IT SEEMS IMPROBABLE THAT THEY WOULD DESIRE SUCH A CONFRONTATION AT THIS TIME. IT IS THUS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THEIR DEMARCHES, MADE AT GDR INSISTENCE, WERE ONLY FOR THE RECORD. THEY COULD HAVE REALIZED THAT THEY HAD LITTLE TO LOSE: IF THE ALLIES AGREED, SO MUCH THE BETTER; IF NOT, THEY COULD STILL DEMONSTRATE TO THE GDR THAT THEY HAD MADE THE EFFORT. MOSCOW MIGHT EVEN HOPE TO USE ITS DEMAND AS A BARGAINING COUNTER, PARTICULARLY IF ITS AIM IS QUADRIpartite CONSULTATIONS.

THE ALLIED AND FRG REACTION TO THE MEASURES TAKEN THUS FAR BY THE GDR HAS BEEN TWOFOLD: MAKING OUR LEGAL POSITION CLEAR THROUGH PROTESTS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND ATTEMPTING TO DETER ADDITIONAL MEASURES THROUGH  
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PAGE 03 BONN 07386 04 OF 05 282149Z

WARNINGS OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE THREE POWERS HAVE REJECTED THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR ELIMINATION OF THE FLAG PATROLS. WHAT IS NECESSARY AT THIS POINT, GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTY AS TO SOVIET INTENTIONS, IS FULLER CONSIDERATION OF OUR OWN FUTURE POLICIES. SEVERAL QUESTIONS MAY BE EXAMINED IN THIS CONNECTION.

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PAGE 01 BONN 07386 05 OF 05 282152Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 07386

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-- GIVEN THE INTEREST OF THE WESTERN SIDE IN THE  
QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT, THERE ARE NARROW LIMITS TO  
THE TYPES OF COUNTERMEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN IN  
BERLIN ITSELF; WHAT OTHER MEANS DO THE ALLIES AND THE  
FRG HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR EXERTING THE NECESSARY  
PRESSURES TO DETER FUTURE MEASURES BY THE USSR AND  
THE GDR?

-- HOW SHOULD THE THREE POWERS AND THE FRG PROCEED  
IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE GDR? WOULD THE  
GDR BEST BE INFLUENCED BY AN ACCELERATION IN THE  
NORMALIZATION OF THESE RELATIONS, SO THAT ITS OBJECTIVE  
INTEREST IN NOT CREATING PROBLEMS IN BERLIN WOULD BE  
INCREASED, OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, BY BEING ISOLATED AS  
THE PRICE OF THE INITIATIVES IT HAS ALREADY TAKEN  
IN BERLIN?

-- ARE THERE OTHER WAYS, IN ADDITION TO  
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PAGE 02 BONN 07386 05 OF 05 282152Z

HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL DEMARCHES, OF MAKING CLEAR TO THE  
SOVIET UNION THAT THE THREE POWERS AND THE FRG  
CONSIDER BERLIN A DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE EVOLUTION OF  
BILATERAL AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND THAT THERE ARE  
LIMITS WHICH MAY NOT BE CROSSED?

-- RECOGNIZING THAT, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES,  
THERE CAN BE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE ADOPTION BY THE  
ALLIES OF A FIRM POLICY ON BERLIN AND THE IMPROVEMENT  
OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, HOW CAN THE THREE ALLIES AND  
THE FRG DEFINE POLICIES WHICH, IF NOT IDENTICAL, ARE AT  
LEAST COMPATIBLE?

-- FINALLY, HOW ARE THE THREE ALLIES AND THE FRG  
TO REACT IF DETERRENCE FAILS AND THE SOVIET UNION IN FACT  
PERMITS THE GDR TO STOP THE ALLIED PATROLS?

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